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On 14 January 2020, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his
Opinion in Case C-78/18 on the restrictions incorporated into a 2017 Hungarian law
on the financing of NGOs from abroad. He makes clear that Hungary’s “Lex NGO”
not only restricts the free movement of capital but also violates several fundamental
rights, and is therefore incompatible with EU law.
Lex NGO
The contested law stigmatizing NGOs (Lex NGO) was adopted in the middle of
June 2017 (Act LXXVI of 2017 on the transparency of foreign funded organisations
adopted on 13 June 2017). Even though under the respective rules in force since
2011, stringent rules applied to civil society organisations, obliging them to submit
very detailed annual financial and narrative reports to the court, the alleged objective
of the law was to ensure greater transparency of civil organizations that receive
donations from foreign entities above a certain amount.
A number of obligations were imposed on affected NGOs. First, any association or
foundation receiving foreign support above the amount of 7.2 million HUF per year
(or according to the most recent modifications 9 million HUF – depending on the
point in time discussed and the exchange rate approximately 21,500-23,500 EUR
per year) was supposed to register with the Hungarian authorities as ‘organisations
in receipt of support from abroad’. When registering, covered entities were also
obliged to indicate donors’ name when their support reached or exceeded 500,000
HUF (approximately 1,500 EUR) and had to give the exact amount of the support. A
database of foreign funded NGOs has been created and published on a free, publicly
accessible electronic platform. Second, they had to indicate on their websites and in
their publications that they are an ‘organisation in receipt of support from abroad’.
The alleged threat to national security
Lex NGO was certainly not the first attack against civil society. Harassment dates
back to 2014 when Hungarian organizations getting money from the EEA/Norway
NGO Grants Fund were intimidated through police raids, investigations carried
out by the Government Control Office and suspension of tax numbers. Raids on
NGOs were later found illegal by the Central Buda District court, but the government
successfully planted the seeds of hostility against civil society. With Lex NGO, in
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essence labelling civil society organizations and their representatives as foreign
agents working against Hungarian interests, the attacks rose to a whole new level.
The claim that NGOs are a threat to national security is reflected, first, in the
Preamble of the law (an unofficial English translation by the Hungarian Helsinki
Committee is available here). Second, the explanations attached to the bill on civil
society organisations refer to the protection of national security among the objectives
of the law. And finally, the way the threshold for registration is determined links
NGOs with terrorism: the sum is twice the amount determined by Article 6(1)(b)
of Act LIII of 2017 on Anti-Money-Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. This is
getting very close to demonizing dissenters as terrorists and indeed the government
claims that NGOs receiving foreign support are helping asylum seekers, and among
them terrorists, to enter the country.
The allegation on the ties to terrorism was reinforced, when a parliamentary
committee on national security conducted a deliberation on NGOs receiving money
from Soros funds. The committee’s report was classified as state secret until 2037,
therefore it was impossible to challenge the claims, while the threat of terrorism and
terrorist activities was successfully linked to NGOs in the minds of the voters. In a
public consultation in the fall of 2017 on the so-called ‘Soros plan’, the government
specifically named the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC), and alleged that the
NGO is complicit in illegal migration. The HHC in the meantime won a legal suit after
having proven in court that the claims were nonsensical. A new low was reached
when an amendment to the Criminal Code introduced by the so-called “Stop Soros”
legislative package was adopted which criminalized humanitarian assistance (see
Hungarian Criminal Code, Article 353/A on the support and promotion of illegal
immigration). To make matters worse, the provision – in sharp contrast to the Venice
Commission’s recommendations – was upheld by the Hungarian Constitutional Court
(HCC).
Reactions to the law and legal challenges
Even before adopting Lex NGO, European Parliament Resolution of 17 May 2017
on the situation in Hungary called upon Hungary to withdraw the draft (Bill T/14967).
Both then First Vice President of the Commission and the EU Fundamental Rights
Agency foresaw that the draft was incompatible with EU law. In the Council of
Europe setting, the Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the law’s effect
shrinking the space for civil society organisations, and in a letter addressed to
the Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament urged the lawmaker to reject the bill.
Even though the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe requested the
government to suspend the parliamentary debate on the bill, while the opinion of the
Venice Commission was pending, and to later incorporate its findings, the drafters
failed to meaningfully respond to the European criticism, especially the preliminary
opinion of the Venice Commission. Adoption of Lex NGO was listed as one of the
government’s mischiefs in the European Parliament’s resolution triggering an Article
7(1) TEU proceeding against Hungary as proof that in Hungary there was a systemic
threat and a clear risk of a serious breach of the values of Article 2 TEU.
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The law was attacked before the HCC, but the constitutional court – already
captured – found a way to avoid confrontation. In order to save face, the HCC
offered an interesting reason to justify its lack of action: the court decided to stay
the proceedings (and also the proceedings concerning Lex CEU) before it in the
name of “European constitutional dialogue”. Whereas this justification may sound as
persuasive and Europe-friendly, in reality it is a fake argument, an abuse of a legal
concept, so as on the one hand, to avoid deciding the case on the merits, and on
the other to grant more time to the government to harass and intimidate NGOs (and
with regard to Lex CEU, to force the Central European University out of the country).
As noted by Gábor Halmai on this blog, the HCC always uses legal concepts and
attaches to them an interpretation that pleases the government most.
On 14 July 2017, the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Hungary
concerning the law on foreign-funded NGOs. The European Commission concluded
that Lex NGO introduces unjustified and disproportionate restrictions to the free
movement of capital enshrined in Article 63 TFEU; and raises concerns regarding
a number of fundamental rights, notably the rights to respect for private life, to
protection of personal data, and to freedom of association as protected by Articles
7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Hungary got a one-month-
deadline to respond to these allegations, a requested extension for the reply was
not granted by the Commission. Hungary replied by letters of 14 August 2017 and 7
September 2017, disputing the criticism. The government insisted that civil groups
remained free to secure funding from any source they choose. The law, in the
government’s view, only ensures the transparent flow of money in the civil sector.
Since the Commission was dissatisfied with this response, it issued a reasoned
opinion on 5 October 2017. A request for extending the one-month-deadline was
again not granted and on 5 December the government denied all allegations by the
Commission. On 7 December 2017, the Commission took the case to the CJEU. It
is of less practical, but important symbolic relevance that Sweden – in line with its
foreign policy prioritising the rule of law – intervened in support of the Commission. A
hearing was held on 22 October 2019.
The AG Opinion in Case C-78/18
Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona in his Opinion first addressed
Hungary’s claim that the action was inadmissible on the ground that Hungary was
not given sufficient time to respond to the Commission. Hungary challenged refusal
of expanding the deadline as a breach of sincere cooperation, the right to good
administration, the right to be heard and the rights of the defense. The AG held
that all circumstances of the case have to be taken into account, but ultimately the
decisive question is whether the Member State subject to an infringement action
had sufficient time to prepare its defense. Whereas the one-month-deadline was
shorter than the usual period of two months granted to respondent states, de facto
Hungary also had two months to respond. Contrary to Hungary’s challenge, the
fact that the Commission decided to take the case to the CJEU only two days
after it got Hungary’s response, is irrelevant from the viewpoint of admissibility.
Although this sounds as a technical matter of lesser importance, it might have
huge implications. It seems the Commission finally realized that time is on the
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side of those who violate the rule of law. While Member States under review
should be able to present their arguments, it makes no sense to prolong the
dialogue with a party that acts in bad faith abusing legal concepts and hiding its real
objective to dismantle the rule of law behind oxymorons such as illiberal democracy
and authoritarian constitutionalism. As I argued in my previous post, it was high
time for the Commission to “acknowledge that further dialogue will only result in
granting sufficient time to complete the capture of state institutions and solidifying an
authoritarian state structure”.
When establishing the actual test for assessing Lex NGO, the Opinion held that
restrictions on civil society organizations that receive foreign funds infringe the
principle of free movement of capital and a number of fundamental rights, and
these matters must be considered jointly, following an integrated approach [49,
81]. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and simultaneously the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, traditional freedoms must be interpreted and, if
needed, redefined in light of Charter rights [85, emphasis in original at 92]. It needs
to be assessed on a case by case basis whether fundamental rights are affected
or not. If not, the traditional test applies, and judges have to look into necessity,
appropriateness and proportionality of the interference [95]. If, however, limitation of
the freedoms is “the primary and direct cause of the infringement of a fundamental
right”, the judicial test must be the same that is applicable to the fundamental
right concerned [97]. In such cases, where fundamental rights are at the core of
the matter, the traditional criteria will still be operationalized, but the stringency of
assessing the necessity, appropriateness and proportionality will be qualified [100].
Once having framed the issue as one of free movement of capital, the Opinion listed
the conditions laid down in the disputed NGO law that limited that freedom. One
such requirement is the registration of NGOs as ‘organisation in receipt of support
from abroad’ and the publication of certain data. Since these conditions apply solely
in the case of donations coming from abroad, they are more likely to affect nationals
of other Member States than Hungarians [111].
Foreign donors might be discouraged from making donations, since they might
not want to have their identity disclosed in an open access database. This may
indirectly limit their freedom of association as guaranteed by the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Rules on foreign donors also violate their right to protection
of private life and personal data, also protected by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. This requirement in Hungarian law not only helps to identify donors, but also
their ideological affinity, for which they might be stigmatized in Hungary [134-136].
Surprisingly for anyone with a law degree and beyond, the Hungarian government
argues that names are no personal data, by invoking Court of Justice jurisprudence
in an abusive manner [130]. But the Advocate General does not fall for it and states
the obvious: publishing natural persons’ names and the amount of donation in
a publicly available register, is an interference in the private life of the persons
concerned as regards the processing of their data [131-134].
Not only the data protection concern, but also the stigmatizing effect of the labeling
requirement results in a “cloud of suspicion [that] hangs over donors, which is
sufficient to dissuade some, or many, from contributing” [123].
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When criticizing the disputed provisions, the opinion also invokes the concept of
European citizenship, when it holds that “EU citizens have a qualified interest in
participation in the economic, social and cultural life of the Member States as a
whole […] turning the ideal of ‘an ever closer union’ into reality” [124].
These are all valid concerns, and per se a violation of EU law, but until this point the
reason does not touch upon the genuine objectives of the Hungarian lawmaker and
the effect of the law, i.e. the silencing of NGOs and preventing them from exercising
government criticism. But this is the point when the Charter – the infamously called
paper tiger – acquires teeth and enables the Advocate General to call a spade a
spade, i.e. an abuse of state power by its name.
Apart from foreign donors, Hungarian NGOs may also be affected.  They may run
into financial difficulties as a result of the law discouraging foreigners to contribute
to their budgets, and, as a consequence, their right to freedom of association, in
fact their “viability and the survival of the organizations” might be jeopardized, which
again may prevent them from achieving their social objectives [120].
Therefore, the requirements of Lex NGO amount to a restriction of the principle of
free movement of capital, and a number of Charter rights, affecting both Hungarian
NGOs and foreign donors.
The Opinion acknowledges that the rights mentioned can be limited, and state
interests pointed out by Hungary – such as public policy, the fight against money
laundering and terrorist financing – may justify rights limitations [137 ff.]. However,
these legitimate aims do not make legislation permissible that imposes ex
ante restrictions indiscriminately on all NGOs receiving foreign funds above a
certain amount. The Opinion also underlines that EU laws on the fight against
money laundering and against terrorist financing – as opposed to the Hungarian
government’s claim – are sufficient guarantees [146]. But even if the Hungarian
government pointed at legitimate state objectives, first, the law is too narrow
by not covering all associations, such as sports clubs and religious entities,
and neither does it cover commercial companies which also perform a decisive
role in the formation of public opinion; second, there is no evidence presented
how the infringement of rights serves the purpose; and third, the measures are
disproportionate. Disproportionality can be traced in the fact that the 500,000 HUF
threshold is excessively low; that all donations from abroad – including those from
EU Member States – are treated indiscriminately as suspicious; that the law has
a stigmatizing effect which may result in a material burden on NGOs; and that the
law is disproportionate in terms of sanctions, which include the winding up of the
organisation if Lex NGO is not complied with [125, 149-151, 158-161].
For the above reasons, the Advocate General concludes that the Hungarian law at
issue unduly restricts the free movement of capital, the rights of respect for private
life, protection of personal data and freedom of association.
Needless to say, Advocate Generals' opinions are not binding, but highly persuasive.
Given the gravity of Lex NGO on both EU law and EU human rights law; the
Hungarian government’s total denial of violations; their unwillingness to enter into a
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meaningful debate with the Commission and change their official position, there is
no reason for the Court of Justice of the EU not to follow Advocate General Campos
Sánchez-Bordona’s assessment.
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